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In January 2010, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Oregon decided U.S. v. Ahrndt, the first case regarding the 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a home wireless internet 
network. The court found that the defendant had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his unsecured home 
wireless network because he had openly shared information 
on a system freely accessible by his neighbors. This Article 
examines the Ahrndt case and the potential legal effect this 
issue may have on an individual’s expectation of privacy in 
his or her wireless network and personal computer files. This 
Article concludes that although the exact effects of new 
technologies on search and seizure law have not been fully 
explored by the courts, people should not expect the courts to 
consider unencrypted wireless networks to be private. 
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Defendant John Henry Ahrndt, on trial for transportation and 
possession of child pornography, challenged the admissibility of key 
evidence based on the fact that the materials were discovered on his 
computer through his home wireless network by a police officer 
without a warrant.1 In the first case of its kind, the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Oregon found that Ahrndt could not have had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in files he shared openly on an 
unsecured wireless network, preventing his claim that the  officer 
violated the Fourth Amendment.2 
This Article discusses the extent of protections against searches 
and seizures under the Fourth Amendment, discusses the new issues 
raised by the Ahrndt case, and  explores possible future cases that 
may present similar issues. This Article also analyzes cases arising 
out of related new technologies to determine their potential influence 
on the law of search and seizure and the legality of searching 
computer networks. 
 
                                                                                                             
1  United States v. Ahrndt, No. 08-468-KI, 2010 WL 373994, at *1 (D. Or. Jan. 
28, 2010). 
2  Id. at *9. 
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I.  FOURTH AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK: AN EMPHASIS ON 
REASONABLENESS 
 
The Fourth Amendment provides citizens with the right to be 
secure from unreasonable government searches and seizures of their 
persons, houses, papers and effects.3 The Amendment provides no 
protection against searches performed by private citizens,4 and it has 
been established that invasions of a defendant’s privacy by 
governmental agents subsequent to invasions by a private party are 
tested by the degree to which they exceed the scope of the private 
search.5 
The United States Supreme Court decision in Katz v. United 
States introduced a two-part test for determining whether a court-
issued warrant is required for a search or seizure.6 First, a person 
must subjectively expect privacy in the thing searched, and second, 
society must recognize this expectation as reasonable.7 The cases 
discussed in this Article, in general, turn on the second prong of this 
test: whether the expectation of privacy is one society accepts as 
reasonable. 
In applying this standard to specific situations, the Supreme Court 
has taken a case-by-case approach. However, some trends emerge 
from an analysis of the relevant cases.8 For example, the Court has 
recognized that developments in technology have served to decrease 
reasonable expectations of privacy.9 
In Rakas v. United States, the Court articulated a standard that is 
often applied by lower courts to evaluate whether a reasonable 
                                                                                                             
3  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
4  United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). 
5  Id. at 115. 
6  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (finding that investigators 
violated a suspect’s reasonable expectation of privacy when they listened to a 
conversation inside a telephone booth using a wiretap). 
7  Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
8  THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND 
INTERPRETATION 64-65 (Carolina Academic Press 2008). 
9  Id. at 65. See also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (“[i]n an 
age where private and commercial flight in the public airways is routine,” there is 
no reasonable expectation of privacy from 1,000 feet in the air). 
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expectation of privacy exists in a given situation.10 In that case, the 
Court stated that “legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must 
have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference 
to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that 
are recognized and permitted by society.”11 Ninth Circuit precedent 
provides further guidance by establishing factors to help courts 
determine whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists. These 
include the defendant’s possessory interest in the thing searched,12 
the measures the defendant took to protect it,13 whether it was labeled 
as private,14 and the presence or absence of a right to exclude 
others.15 With this framework in mind, the remainder of this Article 
discusses the novel issue of whether Fourth Amendment protections 
extend to an unsecured wireless network. 
 
II. DISTRICT COURT FINDS NO REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF 
PRIVACY IN UNSECURED WIRELESS NETWORKS 
 
John Henry Ahrndt was convicted of transportation and 
possession of child pornography in violation of federal law based on 
evidence found on his computer through his wireless network.16 In 
February 2007, an Oregon resident identified as JH was using her 
personal computer when it automatically picked up a nearby wireless 
network, to which she connected.17 JH began using Apple’s iTunes 
software, which allows users to share media files such as digital 
photos and music over computer networks, and noticed that another 
user’s files were available to her over the wireless network.18 After 
reading the names of some of these files, JH realized that they 
contained child pornography and contacted the Washington County 
                                                                                                             
10 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
11 Id. at 143 n.12. 
12 United States v. Broadhurst, 805 F.2d 849, 851 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 United States v. Bautista, 362 F.3d 584, 589 (9th Cir. 2004). 
16 He was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252-2253 (2006). 
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Sheriff’s Office.19 Further police investigation, including using the 
computer belonging to JH to connect to the wireless network, using 
her computer’s iTunes software to access the files in question, and 
opening one of the files, revealed that the files indeed contained child 
pornography and that the network and the files were those of the 
defendant.20 
At trial, Ahrndt filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained 
through his wireless network, arguing that it was the product of a 
search that violated his Fourth Amendment rights.21 The district court 
found that Ahrndt did not demonstrate a subjective expectation of 
privacy, and that even if he had, such an expectation was 
unreasonable because he had left his wireless network unencrypted 
and his iTunes settings openly shared his files with that network.22 
In support of his Fourth Amendment argument, Ahrndt also 
claimed that the files had been part of an electronic communication 
protected by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), 
which he said provided evidence that his expectation of privacy in 
those files was reasonable.23 The ECPA is an amendment to Title III 
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (the 
Federal Wiretap Act). It protects against the interception of electronic 
communications, including those stored on a computer, and 
establishes the legal standards the government must satisfy to obtain 
stored or real-time electronic communications.24 The court found, 
however, that the access was expressly authorized under ECPA 
because the evidence was obtained “through an electronic 
communication system that is configured so that such electronic 
communication is readily accessible to the general public.”25 
  
                                                                                                             
19 Id. 
20 Id. at *2. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at *5. 
23 Id. at *7. 
24 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2006). See also Ahrndt, 2010 WL 373994, at *8. 
25 Ahrndt, 2010 WL 373994, at *8 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2006)). 
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III. IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIVACY IN SECURED AND UNSECURED 
WIRELESS NETWORKS 
 
As wireless networking technology becomes increasingly 
ubiquitous, cases similar to Ahrndt will likely arise. Variations on the 
facts of this case may lead to more difficult constitutional questions. 
As the Supreme Court stated in City of Ontario v. Quon, a case in 
which a municipal employer searched the contents of an employee’s 
city-issued pagers, “[t]he judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully 
on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology 
before its role in society has become clear.”26 Emerging technologies 
such as wireless networks, data encryption, and file-sharing networks 
are likely to raise issues in regard to their potential effects on the 
legality of searches. 
 
A.  Expectation of Privacy in Wireless Communications 
 
Courts have held that people have lower expectations of privacy 
in wireless communications because of the ease with which 
information can be intercepted. Yet legislation may provide 
protection where the Constitution does not. The seminal case on this 
issue is the 1973 decision in United States v. Hall, in which 
defendant-appellant Hall was convicted after using radio telephones 
that had been installed in his car to call landline phones to distribute 
marijuana.27 Hall argued that evidence obtained by intercepting the 
radio calls was the fruit of an illegal search.28 The court stated that 
conversations intercepted in this manner theoretically should not be 
afforded more protection than one between two radio transceivers. 
But the Ninth Circuit explained that it was constrained by the 
language of the Federal Wiretap Act to find that Hall’s 
communication was protected by that statute, which defined “wire 
communication” as any transfer “made in whole or in part through” 
wire, cable, or other like connection, where one end of the phone call 
was made on a landline.29 
                                                                                                             
26 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010). 
27 United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193, 194 (9th Cir. 1973). 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 196-97. See also 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006). 
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The Hall court’s reasoning prevailed in the later decision Tyler v. 
Berodt.30 In that case, the Berodt family listened to conversations the 
Tylers made using a cordless phone connected to their landline 
service. After overhearing conversations that led them to suspect 
criminal activity, the Berodts alerted the police.31 In the ensuing civil 
suit against the Berodts and law enforcement officers, the court was 
unconstrained by the Federal Wiretap Act because the 1986 
amendment by the ECPA changed the definition of “wire 
communication” to exclude the radio portion of a phone call carried 
in part over a wire.32 The Berodt court held that because there was no 
reason for the Tylers to expect privacy in conversations using such a 
device, those conversations were not protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.33 Other courts have found that the wireless portions of 
phone calls also transmitted in part over landlines are not protected 
by the Fourth Amendment.34 In 1994, however, the Federal Wiretap 
Act was amended again to protect wireless communications.35 
The Hall and Berodt cases illustrate that courts generally find that 
wireless communications, especially those using radio frequency 
technology, do not give rise to an expectation of privacy. This is 
based on the fact that radio frequency communications are easily 
intercepted, and a belief that people are generally aware (or should be 
aware) of this fact. 
 
B.  Password Protection 
 
While courts afford less Fourth Amendment protection to wireless 
communications, they have determined that people do have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their personal computer files, 
                                                                                                             
30 Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989). 
31 Id. at 705-06. 
32 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508,  
§ 101(a), 100 Stat. 1848 (“such term [wire communications] does not include the 
radio portion of a cordless telephone [call] that is transmitted between the cordless 
telephone handset and the base unit”). 
33 Berodt, 877 F.2d at 706-07. 
34 See, e.g., United States v. Hoffa, 436 F.2d 1243, 1247 (7th Cir. 1970); 
Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F.Supp. 584, 589 (M.D. La. 1986); State v. DeLaurier, 
488 A.2d 688, 694 (R.I. 1985). 
35 See, e.g., McKamey v. Roach, 55 F.3d 1236, 1240-41 (6th Cir. 1995). 
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especially where the files are password protected. In U.S. v. 
Heckenkemp, the Ninth Circuit held that a student had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his computer’s files despite having used the 
computer to hack into the university’s e-mail system.36 In an appeal 
from his conviction for intentionally accessing a protected computer 
without authorization based in part on evidence collected from his 
computer, the court stated that “he also had a legitimate, objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his personal computer,” and that 
“the mere act of accessing a network does not in itself extinguish 
privacy expectations, nor does the fact that others may have 
occasional access to the computer.”37 The court found the search 
justified on other grounds.38 
A person may lose any expectation of privacy achieved by using a 
password by sharing it with others. In U.S. v. D’Andrea, the 
defendant and her boyfriend had allegedly sexually abused the 
defendant’s eight-year-old daughter and posted pictures of the abuse 
to a password-protected website.39 An anonymous caller to the 
Department of Social Services reported the activity and provided the 
password.40 At trial, D’Andrea challenged the introduction of the 
photos based on her expectation of privacy in them.41 The United 
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held that the 
password protection did convey an expectation of privacy, but 
because she had shared the password to the site with another person, 
she had assumed the risk that it would be exposed.42 
The absence of password protection has also been cited as a 
reason to find that there was not a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in digital files. For example, in Casella v. Borders, a woman lent her 
phone to her boyfriend, who was subsequently arrested.43 A police 
officer discovered sexual photos of the couple on the phone and 
disclosed them publicly.44 In the resulting suit for emotional distress 
                                                                                                             
36 United States v. Heckenkemp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007). 
37 Id. at 1146-47. 
38 Id. at 1147. 
39 United States v. D'Andrea, 497 F.Supp.2d 117, 118 (D. Mass. 2007). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 119. 
42 Id. at 123. 
43 Casella v. Borders, 649 F.Supp.2d 435, 437 (W.D. Va. 2009). 
44 Id. at 473. 
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and Fourth Amendment violations, the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Virginia dismissed her claims because she 
had taken no measures to protect the images, specifically citing the 
absence of password protection on the phone.45 
 
C.  Distinguishing Ahrndt 
 
Even with the Ahrndt decision as precedent, a defendant may 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in computer files that he or 
she did not intend to be shared on even an unencrypted network. In 
Ahrndt, JH would not have stumbled across Ahrndt’s files had he not 
openly shared them on that network through his iTunes software.46 
The holding in this case was thus only that Ahrndt had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in files shared on an unsecured wireless 
network.47 In the words of the court, “in order to hold that defendant 
had no right to privacy, it is also necessary to find that society would 
not recognize as reasonable an expectation of privacy in the contents 
of a shared iTunes library available for streaming on an unsecured 
wireless network.” This is a factual distinction that may make a 
difference in future cases. 
 
D.  Restrictions on Unauthorized Network Access 
 
One additional point on the nature of wireless networking could 
be a potential factor in future cases: state and federal laws prohibit 
accessing a computer network without authorization. For example, 
Oregon makes accessing a computer without authorization a Class A 
misdemeanor, and Washington makes accessing a computer system 
without authorization a gross misdemeanor.48 The federal Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act also criminalizes the unauthorized access of 
                                                                                                             
45 Id. at 439. 
46 See United States v. Ahrndt, No. 08-468-KI, 2010 WL 373994, at *5 (D. Or. 
Jan. 28, 2010) (explaining that the default setting in the iTunes software in question 
was not to share files on the network, indicating that he took affirmative action to 
make the files public). 
47 Ahrndt, 2010 WL 373994, at *5-7. 
48 OR. REV. STAT. § 164.377 (2009) (making “Computer Crime” a Class A 
misdemeanor); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.52.120 (2010) (making “Computer 
Trespass in the Second Degree” a gross misdemeanor). 
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computer networks in some circumstances.49 If these statutes reflect 
societal expectations about privacy, the illegal nature of these actions 
arguably suggest that society is prepared to afford even unsecured 
wireless networks a reasonable expectation of privacy. Ahrndt did not 
argue and the court did not consider this point, perhaps because, 
though illegal, the practice of accessing open wireless networks is 
common and possibly even accepted.50 
 
E.  Reduced Privacy Expectations in File-Sharing Networks 
 
As courts have reduced the reasonable expectation of privacy in 
wireless communications, they have also reduced such expectations 
in the context of file-sharing networks. In two Ninth Circuit cases on 
the issue, the court held that a police officer who accessed child 
pornography on a defendant’s computer through the LimeWire file-
sharing network was not burdened by the prohibitions of the Fourth 
Amendment.51 In U.S. v. Ganoe, the court held that the defendant 
“knew or should have known that the software might allow others to 
access his computer,”52 and that “[m]oreover, he was explicitly 
warned before completing the installation that the folder into which 
files are downloaded would be shared with other users in the peer-to-
peer network.”53 
The defendant in U.S. v. Borowy, a case with very similar facts, 
attempted to distinguish Ganoe by arguing that the defendant had 
specifically downloaded a version of the software with an option 
(which he attempted to engage) that could block others from 
accessing his files.54 The court held he had no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in his files available to LimeWire because he had 
downloaded and used software that he knew would allow others to 
                                                                                                             
49 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006). 
50 See Randy Cohen, The Ethicist: Wi-Fi Fairness, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2004), 
http://wwnytimes.com/2004/02/08/magazine/08ETHICIST.html (arguing that it is 
ethical to “use but not overuse Wi-Fi hot spots you encounter”). 
51 See United States v. Ganoe, 538 F.3d 1117, 1119 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. 
denied, 129 S.Ct 2037 (2009); United States v. Borowy, 595 F.3d 1045, 1046 (9th 
Cir. 2010). 
52 See Ganoe, 538 F.3d at 1117. 
53 See Ganoe, 538 F.3d at 1127. 
54 Borowy, 595 F.3d at 1047. 
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view his files and had failed to take the steps necessary to prevent 
others from doing so.55 
This recent case law illustrates that with both wireless and file-
sharing networks, users often set up hardware and software with 
default settings, typically leaving the networks open to the public 
despite warnings that there are steps that can be taken to protect the 
data. This practice appears to reduce the amount of privacy that users 




The Ahrndt case is the first to deal with expectations of privacy in 
wireless networks, but it likely represents the first case of many to 
raise these sorts of constitutional questions. New technologies 
generally decrease the amount of privacy people have in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects, and the courts have begun to 
outline some of the contours of this area of the law. Wireless 
communications generally cannot be expected to be private. 
Encrypted or password-protected digital files, however, can generally 
be expected to be private. Finally, where a person exposes his or her 
computer or files to the world, as most file-sharing network users 
(and many wireless-network users) do, he or she loses any 
expectation of privacy in the files. The Ahrndt decision is consistent 
with prior law and signals a sensible rule going forward. 
  
                                                                                                             
55 Id. at 1048. 
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